Proposal Explorer

Add claims to see which ones the mechanisms address.

Built for an adversarial prover

Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization, Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors and Remote detection of data centres

No new hardware needed

On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters and Remote detection of data centres

Attack testing records published testing for this use. It does not by itself show independent review, a formal proof or that a deployed system is secure.

• Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization: Analysis
• Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: Analysis
• On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters: Red-teamed
• Remote detection of data centres: Analysis

Open significant failures

7 failures in 3 mechanisms

• Operator control of pod routing collapses the bound in Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization

  Lucid's analysis finds that if the operator can freely assign pods to routers, it could dedicate a whole cell of 100 or more pods to one pipeline stage. The bound then falls to about 90–220x uncompressed and as low as about 25x with compression. The proposed mitigation, auditor-controlled random assignment that is periodically re-randomized, has not been implemented. ²

  Known failure · Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

• Parallel scale-up switches are hard enforcement points in Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization

  In GB200 topologies, GPUs reach GPUs in other nodes through NVSwitches without a NIC on the path. Amodo notes that limits are hard to enforce there because many switches work in parallel, so compromising one or two would bypass the limit. ⁵

  Known failure · Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

• State attackers can likely defeat current secure enclosures in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

  The flexHEG authors write that "nation-state attackers can likely compromise the best current secure enclosures", and that the marginal cost of circumvention per device is hard to estimate. RAND similarly judges that anti-tamper measures "would not be insurmountable for a determined and well-resourced adversary", although they raise costs and can reveal tampering. ^{9 11}

  Known failure · Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

• Firmware-only retrofits rely on Secure Boot, which fault injection can bypass in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

  Part II notes that the most common attack on Secure Boot replaces the firmware and applies a voltage glitch while the signature is being checked. It also notes that sophisticated actors may use microprobing or laser voltage probing to read key registers. ⁹

  Known failure · Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

• FLOP accounting can be laundered through external data in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

  Results of earlier or parallel workloads could be hidden in the "external data" fed to a device, which would falsify the total FLOP count unless the inputs are explained or time delays are imposed. ⁹

  Known failure · Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

• Adversarially disguised fine-tuning partly evades classification in On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters

  Across 20 evasion strategy families in five monitor-evader rounds, the classifier's accuracy against the most challenging disguised workloads held out from training was 43–87%. White-box LoRA fine-tuning was the only evasion family detected less than half the time. The evaluation covered single nodes, PyTorch-level evasion and NVIDIA hardware. ¹⁶

  Known failure · Demonstrated attack · Significant · Open. On the record

• Counters leak information about protected workloads in On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters

  Performance counters have been used as a side channel against TEEs, for example in CounterSEVeillance. NVIDIA disables performance counters in full confidential-computing mode, stating that they could provide an avenue for side-channel attacks. Richer counters for verification therefore pull against confidentiality. ^{17 18}

  Known failure · Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record

Scope limitations

• Undeclared local storage raises per-pod capacity in Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization

  More memory or storage per pod helps an adversary. Lucid requires per-pod storage to be declared, capped and physically inspected. ²

  Scope limitation · Theoretical argument. On the record

• Training within one pod is not covered in Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization

  Lucid's bounds concern pre-training models larger than the pods are sized for. Training models that fit in one pod, fine-tuning and reinforcement-learning post-training within one pod are outside the modelled threat. ²

  Scope limitation · Open question. On the record

• Many important rules cannot be checked on-chip in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

  Malicious intent "is not a technical property observable on-chip", and misuse depends on what is done with a computation's results. A guarantee processor cannot easily tell whether a network is the whole system or one expert in a mixture-of-experts system. Part III judges that a fully local ruleset "may not be entirely feasible" for the same reason. ^{8 10}

  Scope limitation · Theoretical argument. On the record

• Coverage stops at flexHEG-equipped chips in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

  Motivated actors will always be able to use some compute that is not flexHEG-equipped. Recalling existing consumer GPUs would likely be impractical, and reaching perfect coverage, or conclusively proving that no secret government data centres exist, would be "practically quite difficult". ^{8 10}

  Scope limitation · Open question. On the record

  Related mechanism Proposed Chip registries and manufacturing records: Accounts for which chips exist and who holds them. A pointer, not evidence that this failure is mitigated. Add

  Related mechanism Proposed Remote detection of data centres: Looks for undeclared facilities that hold other chips. A pointer, not evidence that this failure is mitigated. In the proposal.

• Software-read telemetry can be forged by the operator in On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters

  NVML-based classification assumes trustworthy telemetry. Without a tamper-resistant read path, an authenticated telemetry channel and secure boot of the monitoring software, an operator who controls the full software stack could forge counter values. Monfared et al. start from the same premise: current GPUs expose little trusted telemetry and can be modified or virtualized. ^{14 16}

  Scope limitation · Theoretical argument. On the record

  Related mechanism Proposed Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors: A guarantee processor on the chip would give the tamper-resistant, authenticated telemetry path the flaw says is missing. A pointer, not evidence that this failure is mitigated. In the proposal.

• Timing challenges do not identify the individual chip in On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters

  GEMM and VDF challenges can be answered by identical GPUs elsewhere, and floating-point fingerprints distinguish GPU models, not individual devices. GPU virtualization adds timing leakage that prevents attributing compute use. ¹⁴

  Scope limitation · Theoretical argument. On the record

• Facilities can be disguised or hidden in Remote detection of data centres

  Halstead and Larsen discuss two ways to hide a facility. One is to disguise it as a legitimate industrial site. The other is to build it underground, with cooling that avoids visible heat plumes. They note that the underground option requires bespoke engineering. ¹⁹

  Scope limitation · Theoretical argument. On the record

• Small sites may not be detectable in Remote detection of data centres

  Halstead and Larsen conclude that a sufficiently small covert project could not be ruled out with confidence. In their estimates, the chance of detection is lower for smaller sites. Krawec notes that small data centres in existing buildings may lack the distinctive features of large facilities. ^{19 21}

  Scope limitation · Theoretical argument. On the record

  Related mechanism Proposed Chip registries and manufacturing records: Accounts for chips from the fab onwards, which does not depend on a site being visible. A pointer, not evidence that this failure is mitigated. Add

Open questions

• Low-communication training reduces the bandwidth training needs in Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization

  DiLoCo matched fully synchronous training on 8 workers while communicating 500 times less. Rahman writes that this family of methods theoretically allows large-scale training with less than 100 Mbps. Lucid includes these methods in its bounds, but notes that extreme activation compression, architectures with unusually small inter-layer widths, or modular paradigms could erode the margin. ^{2 6 7}

  Open question · Theoretical argument. On the record

• Supply-chain diversion and hidden backdoors in Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

  Components could be diverted before a guarantee processor is added, and backdoors could be introduced during design or manufacturing. Open-source designs and physical scans of randomly selected chips are proposed as countermeasures. Part III proposes international oversight of production and extensive testing of a random sample of finished devices. ^{9 10}

  Open question · Open question. On the record

  Related mechanism Proposed Chip registries and manufacturing records: Records each chip's identity and owner from the fab onwards, which bears on diversion before a guarantee processor is fitted. It does not address hidden backdoors. A pointer, not evidence that this failure is mitigated. Add

• No quantified error rates or formal thresholds for timing primitives in On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters

  Monfared et al. state that false-positive and false-negative rates are not quantified and leave hardware-specific formal thresholds to future work. ¹⁴

  Open question · Open question. On the record

• Search for unknown sites is undemonstrated in Remote detection of data centres

  Krawec reports that telling data centres apart from other industrial facilities systematically is difficult. Automating detection would need large amounts of training imagery and a purpose-trained model. In Krawec's words, automated data-centre detection "remains primarily conceptual at present". ²¹

  Open question · Open question. On the record

Not yet demonstrated

Proposed Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors and Proposed Remote detection of data centres

Need new chip designs

Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

Mechanisms on the map that are not in the proposal. Pointers, not recommendations. ?

• Research demo Tamper evidence for verifier devices Add
  • Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization waits on it. Shaping devices and routing assignments must be trusted by both parties; Amodo has not yet fully analysed resilience to a compromised DPU.
  • Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors waits on it. State-level attackers who hold the hardware can likely compromise the best current secure enclosures.
• Proposed Chip registries and manufacturing records Add
  • Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors waits on it. Governing all relevant chips depends on knowing where they are, through chip registries and detection of undeclared facilities.
• Proposed Network taps and certifiers Add
  • Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization waits on it. The verifier must know that all traffic leaving a pod crosses the capped, monitored links.
• Operational use TEE remote attestation for AI workloads Add
  • Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors depends on it.
  • On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters depends on it.

Missing prerequisites

• Research demo Tamper evidence for verifier devices needed by Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization Add
• Operational use TEE remote attestation for AI workloads needed by Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors and On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters Add
• Proposed Chip registries and manufacturing records needed by Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors Add

Shared foundations

• Tamper evidence for verifier devices relied on by Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization and Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors
• TEE remote attestation for AI workloads relied on by Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors and On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters

Blockers

16 blockers recorded

• Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization
  • No cap that a verifier can check has been implemented or red-teamed. Adversarial validation ²
  • The verifier must know that all traffic leaving a pod crosses the capped, monitored links. Coverage & hidden compute. Waits on Network taps and certifiers ³
  • Shaping devices and routing assignments must be trusted by both parties; Amodo has not yet fully analysed resilience to a compromised DPU. Hardware trust. Waits on Tamper evidence for verifier devices ^{2 5}
  • Advances in low-communication training could shrink the margin that the cap enforces. Capacity bounds ^{2 6 7}
• Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors
  • Integrated flexHEG needs substantial help from the accelerator manufacturer, and the authors estimate 3.7–7.9 years, from when the manufacturer starts work, for such hardware to displace other accelerators in frontier development. Access & governance ⁹
  • State-level attackers who hold the hardware can likely compromise the best current secure enclosures. Hardware trust. Waits on Tamper evidence for verifier devices ^{9 11}
  • Rival states would need to trust the design and manufacture of guarantee processors and enclosures, for example through open design, redundant processors from each side or oversight of production. Hardware trust ^{8 10}
  • Restricting future rule updates would need a formal language for rules, which the authors judge most likely infeasible for early flexHEG versions. Protocol soundness ⁸
  • Governing all relevant chips depends on knowing where they are, through chip registries and detection of undeclared facilities. Coverage & hidden compute. Waits on Chip registries and manufacturing records ¹⁰
• On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters
  • Shipping accelerators need a tamper-resistant, authenticated telemetry path. Hardware trust. Waits on Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors ^{15 16}
  • NVIDIA's full confidential-computing mode disables the hardware performance counters its profiling tools use, so telemetry that needs them conflicts with it. Privacy & leakage ^{17 18}
  • Continuous challenge puzzles cost power and throughput on production workloads. Performance & compatibility ¹⁴
  • Evaluation has not gone beyond single nodes, framework-level evasion and one vendor's hardware. Adversarial validation ¹⁶
• Remote detection of data centres
  • Wide-area, automated detection of data centres is not yet practical and needs large training datasets. Coverage & hidden compute ²¹
  • No measured detection or false-alarm rates for finding undeclared facilities have been published. Adversarial validation ^{19 21}
  • Recent high-resolution imagery is costly, is limited by weather and needs trained analysts. Access & governance ²¹

From the family or selected implementation's record. ?

Model weights

Depends on the design for On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters.

Hidden by Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors.

Not involved: Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization and Remote detection of data centres.

Inputs and outputs

Depends on the design for On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters.

Hidden by Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors.

Not involved: Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization and Remote detection of data centres.

Training data

Depends on the design for On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters.

Hidden by Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors.

Not involved: Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization and Remote detection of data centres.

Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization

• Proposed AI 2040 inference-only verification stack Proposed architecture, AI Futures Project
• Proposed RAND secure inference data center (SIDC) design Proposed architecture, RAND

Hardware-enabled guarantees (flexHEG) and guarantee processors

None on the map

On-chip telemetry from timing, memory and performance counters

None on the map

Remote detection of data centres

None on the map

1. Verification Plan, R. Dean (2026). Original
2. Traffic Shaping for Workload Classification, Lucid Computing (2026). Original
3. A System Overview for Near-Term, Low-Trust AI Compute Verification, N. Cankaya (2026). Original
4. De-risking Interconnect Limits for AI Verification, A. Scher et al. (2026). Original
5. The Tray as a Bandwidth Boundary, Amodo Design (2026). Original
6. DiLoCo: Distributed Low-Communication Training of Language Models, A. Douillard et al. (2024). Original
7. Does Distributed Training Undermine Compute Governance?, R. Rahman (2026). Original
8. Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees for AI Compute, J. Petrie et al. (2025). Original
9. Technical Options for Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees, J. Petrie & O. Aarne (2025). Original
10. International Security Applications of Flexible Hardware-Enabled Guarantees, O. Aarne & J. Petrie (2025). Original
11. Hardware-Enabled Governance Mechanisms: Developing Technical Solutions to Exempt Items Otherwise Classified Under Export Control Classification Numbers 3A090 and 4A090, G. Kulp et al. (2024). Original
12. Secure, Governable Chips: Using On-Chip Mechanisms to Manage National Security Risks from AI & Advanced Computing, O. Aarne et al. (2024). Original
13. Hardware-Enabled Mechanisms for Verifying Responsible AI Development, A. O'Gara et al. (2025). Original
14. Timing and Memory Telemetry on GPUs for AI Governance, S. K. Monfared et al. (2026). Original
15. Guaranteeable Memory: An HBM-Based Chiplet for Verifiable AI Workloads, J. Petrie (2025). Original
16. Detecting Hidden ML Training With Zero-Overhead Telemetry, R. Rahman & S. Tajdari (2026). Original
17. On TEEs for Privacy-Preserving Monitoring in AI Governance, Gloria Z (2026). Original
18. NVIDIA Secure AI with Blackwell and Hopper GPUs (White Paper), NVIDIA (2025). Original
19. Covert AI Projects, B. Halstead & T. Larsen (2026). Original
20. Verifying International Agreements on AI: Six Layers of Verification for Rules on Large-Scale AI Development and Deployment, M. Baker et al. (2025). Original
21. Tracking Hyperscale AI Data Center Growth with Satellite Imagery, C. Krawec (2026). Original
22. Introducing the Frontier Data Centers Hub, Epoch AI (2025). Original
23. AI Data Centers Documentation – Methodology, Epoch AI (2026). Original