Proposal Explorer
ResetA verification proposal from the AI Verification Tech Map, from its records of 2026-10-09. https://trustbutveri.fyi/explorer/?mechanisms=M-0002,M-0014&implementations=M-0014:I-0011&cols=hardware
Analysis
Applied filters: none. Every filter is set to Any.
Overview
| Mechanism | Development | Security evidence | Open failures | Hardware |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Deterministic and bit-exact inference | Operational use | Published security analysis | none | None |
| Bandwidth limits and compartmentalizationAI 2040 inference-only verification stack | Proposed | No published adversarial analysis recorded | 1 significantFamily context below | Retrofit device |
- Open failures: n critical n significant n minor
Claim coverageNo claims yet
Add claims to see which ones the mechanisms address.
Properties1 with operational use · 2 built for an adversarial prover
- Operational use
- Operational use Deterministic and bit-exact inference for reproducing open-model inference from receipts in Gensyn's information-market service
- Built for an adversarial prover
- Deterministic and bit-exact inference and Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization
- No new hardware needed
- Deterministic and bit-exact inference
Attack testing1 mechanism with published testing
Attack testing records published testing for this use. It does not by itself show independent review, a formal proof or that a deployed system is secure.
- Deterministic and bit-exact inference: Analysis
Limits1 family with findings to check · 4 scope limitations · 1 not yet demonstrated · 1 mechanism with open significant failures
- Family findings
- Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization
Context for AI 2040 inference-only verification stack. Findings from the mechanism family appear here as context. They apply to an implementation only when its own record lists them, under the conditions stated there.
Low-communication training reduces the bandwidth training needs in Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization
DiLoCo matched fully synchronous training on 8 workers while communicating 500 times less. Rahman writes that this family of methods theoretically allows large-scale training with less than 100 Mbps. Lucid includes these methods in its bounds, but notes that extreme activation compression, architectures with unusually small inter-layer widths, or modular paradigms could erode the margin. 19 20 21
Open question · Theoretical argument. On the record
Operator control of pod routing collapses the bound in Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization
Lucid's analysis finds that if the operator can freely assign pods to routers, it could dedicate a whole cell of 100 or more pods to one pipeline stage. The bound then falls to about 90–220x uncompressed and as low as about 25x with compression. The proposed mitigation, auditor-controlled random assignment that is periodically re-randomized, has not been implemented. 21
Known failure · Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record
Undeclared local storage raises per-pod capacity in Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization
More memory or storage per pod helps an adversary. Lucid requires per-pod storage to be declared, capped and physically inspected. 21
Scope limitation · Theoretical argument. On the record
Training within one pod is not covered in Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization
Lucid's bounds concern pre-training models larger than the pods are sized for. Training models that fit in one pod, fine-tuning and reinforcement-learning post-training within one pod are outside the modelled threat. 21
Scope limitation · Open question. On the record
Parallel scale-up switches are hard enforcement points in Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization
In GB200 topologies, GPUs reach GPUs in other nodes through NVSwitches without a NIC on the path. Amodo notes that limits are hard to enforce there because many switches work in parallel, so compromising one or two would bypass the limit. 22
Known failure · Theoretical argument · Significant · Open. On the record
- Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization
- Open significant failures
1 failure in 1 mechanism
A recomputation family degrades against prompt-controlling adversaries in AI 2040 inference-only verification stack
The plan's companion page names DiFR among the recomputation schemes being tested. An independent study found that Gumbel-based inference verification, the family that includes Token-DiFR, leaks roughly twice as many bits per token when the adversary chooses prompts that disrupt the text's structure, across six models of 1 to 32 billion parameters. The slowdown it imposes on a hidden-signalling adversary falls from 146–254 times under benign prompts to 60–118 times. The attack weakens the bound on hidden information in outputs, which the plan relies on to keep undeclared results from leaving. 12 13 17 18
Known failure · Demonstrated attack · Significant · Open. On the record
- Scope limitations
Some kernels remain genuinely nondeterministic in Deterministic and bit-exact inference
The bit-exact work separates kernels that are deterministic but not batch-invariant from truly nondeterministic ones that use atomic functions. Some integer de-quantization kernels use atomic additions and remain nondeterministic, so exact replay needs backends that avoid them. 1
Scope limitation · Open question. On the record
Cross-hardware replay relies on reverse-engineered, closed behaviour in Deterministic and bit-exact inference
Emulating one GPU's rounding on another requires reverse-engineering tensor-core arithmetic and modelling proprietary kernel choices. Hawkeye covers a subset of NVIDIA architectures and states that attention and other higher-level operations need further reverse engineering. For the bit-exact emulator, a proprietary Hopper kernel family is an open edge case. 1 3
Scope limitation · Open question. On the record
The recomputation server must be trusted in AI 2040 inference-only verification stack
The plan calls the integrity of the recomputation server an extremely important aspect, and its argument that sampling verifies all outputs assumes that the server's computations and outputs can be trusted. The companion page notes that the server sits inside the prover's facility, possibly under the prover's physical control, and that hardening it against integrity attacks needs significant research. Amodo rates recomputation-server security as not on track. 12 13 15
Scope limitation · Theoretical argument. On the record
Spare compute is not verified in AI 2040 inference-only verification stack
The plan states that it does not verify that spare compute is unused for unapproved workloads, because this seems very challenging. It relies instead on side-channel bounds and memory wipes, so that the only results that persist are verified inference outputs. 12
Scope limitation · Theoretical argument. On the record
- Not yet demonstrated
- Proposed Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization
Possible additions6 for dependencies
Mechanisms on the map that are not in the proposal. Pointers, not recommendations.
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- Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization waits on it. Checking that taps are correctly installed and stay in place at scale is not a solved problem, and hardening the recomputation server inside the prover's facility needs significant research.
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- Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization waits on it. Memory wiping may use existing algorithms, but hardware testing is at an early stage.
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- Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization waits on it. Passive optical taps work at 400G, but the 800G and 1600G line rates now arriving in data centres are undemonstrated.
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- Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization waits on it. There is no plan yet for quickly scaling side-channel defences on a frontier cluster; only early theoretical pieces exist.
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- Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization waits on it. A fully reproducible inference stack needs substantial software and tooling, and per-packet network reproducibility may need considerable software, firmware and possibly hardware work.
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- Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization depends on it.
Dependencies2 missing prerequisites · 10 blockers
- Missing prerequisites
- Operational use Sampled inference recomputation needed by Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization Add
- Proposed Whole-workload recomputation (reproducible packets) needed by Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization Add
- Blockers
10 blockers recorded
- Deterministic and bit-exact inference
- Batch-invariant kernels cost throughput: in Thinking Machines' Qwen3-8B test, an improved deterministic build took 42 s against 26 s for vLLM's default, and SGLang reports an average 34.35% slowdown on its FlashInfer and FlashAttention 3 backends. Performance & compatibility 2 4
- Coverage is incomplete: the bit-exact emulator targets dense blocks on NVIDIA GPUs and excludes mixture-of-experts inference and training, and vLLM's batch-invariant mode is in beta, with open work on AMD hardware and speculative decoding. Performance & compatibility 1 5 23
- Amodo's status page for the AI 2040 verification plan rates a reproducible inference stack for that plan as 'not started'. Performance & compatibility 15
- Exact replay requires the prover to disclose weights, software versions, parallelism and batch sizes to whoever recomputes. Privacy & leakage 1 11
- Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization
- A fully reproducible inference stack needs substantial software and tooling, and per-packet network reproducibility may need considerable software, firmware and possibly hardware work. Performance & compatibility. Waits on Whole-workload recomputation (reproducible packets) 13
- Passive optical taps work at 400G, but the 800G and 1600G line rates now arriving in data centres are undemonstrated. Performance & compatibility. Waits on Network taps and certifiers 13
- Checking that taps are correctly installed and stay in place at scale is not a solved problem, and hardening the recomputation server inside the prover's facility needs significant research. Hardware trust. Waits on Tamper evidence for verifier devices 13 15
- There is no plan yet for quickly scaling side-channel defences on a frontier cluster; only early theoretical pieces exist. Coverage & hidden compute. Waits on Side-channel suppression for isolated facilities 13
- Memory wiping may use existing algorithms, but hardware testing is at an early stage. Coverage & hidden compute. Waits on Memory wiping and proofs of secure erasure 13
- Robust red-teaming of recomputation schemes has not started, and most algorithm development remains academic. Adversarial validation 13 15
- Deterministic and bit-exact inference
What the verifier sees1 unspecified · 1 depend on design
From the family or selected implementation's record.
- Model weights
Depends on the design for Deterministic and bit-exact inference.
Unspecified for Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization. Check the implementation record.
- Inputs and outputs
Depends on the design for Deterministic and bit-exact inference.
Unspecified for Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization. Check the implementation record.
- Training data
Not involved: Deterministic and bit-exact inference.
Unspecified for Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization. Check the implementation record.
Exposure notes
- Deterministic and bit-exact inference: Exact replay needs the weights, configuration and replayed requests inside the recomputation environment. What the verifier sees depends on whether that environment keeps them confidential. 1 11
- Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization, AI 2040 inference-only verification stack: This Explorer has no asset-specific exposure assessment for this implementation. Check its source and deployment assumptions.
Implementations5 systems
- Deterministic and bit-exact inference
- Research demo Batch-invariant inference kernels (Thinking Machines) Open-source project, Thinking Machines Lab
- Operational use Verde and RepOps (Gensyn) Product, Gensyn
- Proposed Low-trust AI compute verification system overview Proposed architecture, Machine Intelligence Research Institute
- Bandwidth limits and compartmentalization
- Proposed AI 2040 inference-only verification stack Proposed architecture, AI Futures Project
- Proposed RAND secure inference data center (SIDC) design Proposed architecture, RAND
Sources23 cited
- Bit-Exact AI Inference Verification Without Performance Tradeoffs, N. Cankaya (2026). Original
- Defeating Nondeterminism in LLM Inference, H. He & Thinking Machines Lab (2025). Original
- Hawkeye: Reproducing GPU-Level Non-Determinism, E. Badash et al. (2026). Original
- Towards Deterministic Inference in SGLang and Reproducible RL Training, The SGLang Team (2025). Original
- Batch Invariance (vLLM documentation), vLLM project (2026). Original
- gensyn-ai/ree: Gensyn Reproducible Execution Environment (GitHub repository), Gensyn (2026). Original
- EigenCloud Brings Verifiable AI to Mass Market with EigenAI and EigenCompute Launches, EigenCloud (2025). Original
- Building Delphi: Pricing, Settlement, and Agentic Trading, D. Jedamski (2026). Original
- Reproducible Execution Environment (REE) (Gensyn documentation), Gensyn (2026). Original
- What is Delphi? (Delphi documentation), Gensyn (2026). Original
- A System Overview for Near-Term, Low-Trust AI Compute Verification, N. Cankaya (2026). Original
- Verification Plan, R. Dean (2026). Original
- Get Involved in Verification, AI Futures Project (2026). Original
- Verifying international AI deals: Plan A, the state-of-play, and what you can do to help, T. Milton et al. (2026). Original
- AI 2040 Plan A — Verification SITREP, Amodo Design (2026). Original
- Fitting a Network TAP to our Inference Verification Prototype, Amodo Design (2026). Original
- Verifying LLM Inference to Detect Model Weight Exfiltration, R. Rinberg et al. (2025). Original
- Adversarial Entropy Inflation Against Gumbel-Based Inference Verification, N. Kezins (2026). Original
- DiLoCo: Distributed Low-Communication Training of Language Models, A. Douillard et al. (2024). Original
- Does Distributed Training Undermine Compute Governance?, R. Rahman (2026). Original
- Traffic Shaping for Workload Classification, Lucid Computing (2026). Original
- The Tray as a Bandwidth Boundary, Amodo Design (2026). Original
- [Feature]: Batch Invariant Feature and Performance Optimization (vLLM issue #27433), vLLM project contributors (2025). Original
Share the link to this proposal. This proposal is also available as plain text and JSON.
Filter mechanisms
Filters apply to mechanisms only. They describe the setting a proposal is for, and all are off by default. A mechanism that a filter rules out is flagged and does not count towards claim coverage. Selected implementations use their own record fields. A match means not excluded; conditional or unspecified exposure stays with a note. Passing a filter does not establish that the assumptions hold in a deployment.
All 25 mechanisms match.
Prover
How far can the party being checked be trusted?
The prover is the party being checked. Semi-trusted designs rely on part of its stack: usually the chip vendor's hardware root of trust, its firmware or counters, or its supply-chain records. Adversarial designs aim to hold even if it cheats wherever the checks allow, within their stated assumptions.
Keeps mechanisms whose threat model holds against at least this prover. Adversarial is the strongest assumption. Definitions
Verifier devices on site
May the verifier install its own hardware at the prover's sites?
Some mechanisms need a device the verifier owns or trusts at the prover's facility, such as a network tap, a bandwidth limiter or a sealed sensor. Choose Not allowed when the setting rules that out. Inspectors are not covered.
"Not allowed" removes mechanisms that need a retrofit device, such as a network tap or a sealed sensor. Definitions
Prover cooperation
How much must the prover take part?
Required: the prover takes part, for example by logging requests, producing proofs or opening records. Partial: some access, such as installing a device. Not required: works from outside, such as satellite imagery.
"Partial at most" removes mechanisms that need the prover's active participation. "Not required" keeps only those that work without it. Definitions
Chips
May the proposal depend on new chip designs?
New chip features take years to reach a deployed fleet and cover only chips made after they ship. Mechanisms that use shipping features, such as trusted execution environments or performance counters, stay.
"Existing chips only" removes mechanisms that need changes to future chip designs. Definitions
Minimum development status
Development status
A level describes the public evidence for a mechanism's stated use, not its cost or feasibility. R3 can still have open critical flaws.
Keeps mechanisms whose readiness level is at least this one. Definitions
Attack testing
How hard has each mechanism been attacked in public?
The strongest published attempt to break the mechanism for its verification use: a security analysis, red-teaming by its developers or collaborators, or a red team independent of them.
Keeps mechanisms whose strongest published attack testing is at least this. Definitions
Keep hidden from the verifier
What must the verifier never see? Choose any.
Model weights: the checked model's parameters. Inputs and outputs: the requests a deployed model serves and its responses. Training data: what a model was trained on. Each mechanism's exposure is the editors' reading of its record: shown, depends on the design (kept, with a note), hidden, not involved, or unspecified for a selected implementation. Code and configuration are not covered yet.
Removes mechanisms that show the asset to the verifier. Conditional or unspecified exposure stays with a note and needs checking against the privacy requirement.
Claims
A claim is something one party wants to verify about another party's AI hardware or software. Each claim's number shows how the proposal addresses it.
- Addressed. A mechanism in the proposal is aimed at this claim and is not excluded by the filters.
- Partly addressed. Only supporting mechanisms, or mechanisms aimed at it that the filters exclude.
- Unaddressed. No mechanism in the proposal addresses this claim.
Addressed means a mechanism in the proposal is aimed at the claim and is not excluded by your filters. It does not mean the claim is verified: check its assessed use, development status, security evidence, assumptions and findings.
Mechanisms
A mechanism is a general technique for verifying claims. Its badge is its development status for its stated use. An optional implementation choice narrows its assumptions, assessed use and claim links to that record. Lines join it to the claims it addresses. Click a line for details.Under its name it lists the claims it is aimed at or supports.
- Aimed at the claim: verifying it is a direct purpose of the mechanism.
- Supports the claim: helps verify it without being aimed at it.
- Faint: excluded by your filters, so it does not count towards claim coverage.
Overview
One row per mechanism in the proposal. Every mark comes from that mechanism's record, as listed in the panels below; what the verifier sees is the editors' reading of the record's text. Failure counts are per mechanism. Summary counts name mechanisms with open failures, not a sum of attacks. Choosing an implementation narrows each row to that record's assessed use; family findings remain as context. Findings are grouped as known failures, scope limitations and open questions. Only known failures count as failures. Counts are an inventory of published findings, not a risk score.
What the verifier sees
For model weights, inputs and outputs, and training data. This is the editors' reading of each mechanism's record (its threat model, how it works and its limitations), not a field of the record. Shown: the verifier sees it. Depends: on the design or variant, or the verifier sees only samples. Hidden: the verifier sees only commitments, hashes, proofs or results. Not involved: the record does not handle it. Unspecified: the selected implementation has no asset-specific assessment here.
Possible additions
Mechanisms on the map, not in the proposal, that the records connect to an unaddressed or partly addressed claim, an open failure or a dependency. They are pointers, not recommendations: each brings its own readiness level and findings, and none is claimed to close a failure. Links from failures are the editors' reading of the two records.
Start from a goal
A goal is something a rule or agreement about AI sets out to achieve. Choosing one loads the claims it needs verified. Your mechanisms and filters stay as they are.
- Cap frontier training2 direct, 3 supportingKeep every AI training run below an agreed amount of compute.
- Pause frontier AI development2 direct, 3 supportingStop new AI training runs and experiments for an agreed period, while existing models stay in service.
- Deploy only evaluated models2 direct, 3 supportingDeploy powerful AI models widely only after their risks have been evaluated and judged manageable.
- Prevent catastrophic misuse2 direct, 2 supportingKeep capable AI models from helping anyone carry out catastrophic attacks, such as biological or chemical ones.
- Prevent weight theft1 direct, 1 supportingKeep the weights of capable AI models from being copied out of the facilities that hold them.
- Enforce chip export controls1 directKeep export-controlled AI chips at the destinations they were authorised for.
Start from a published design
Choosing a design loads the mechanisms its record realises or depends on. If the proposal has no claims yet, it also loads the claims that record says the design addresses.
- AI 2040 inference-only verification stack7 mechanismsProposed architecture, AI Futures Project
- Low-trust AI compute verification system overview7 mechanismsProposed architecture, Machine Intelligence Research Institute
- RAND secure inference data center (SIDC) design2 mechanismsProposed architecture, RAND